

15 MAR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List

FROM:

Director of Global Issues

25X1

SUBJECT:

Kenya: Scenarios of Dramatic Political  
Change

25X1

1. This memorandum presents a number of possible scenarios that could end ultimately in the ouster of President Moi. It thus complements Intelligence Community assessments and estimates that focus on probable further developments in Kenya. The analysis, purposely provocative, aims to make explicit and bring to the forefront of our thinking the diversity of challenges that could threaten the Moi regime in the years to come. Because the analysis out of context is susceptible to misunderstanding, external distribution has been severely restricted. Please limit circulation in your office and do not reproduce the document. Your thoughts on the analysis and suggested indicators are welcome.

25X1

2. We will send you similar papers on other countries as they are completed.

25X1

25X1

Attachment:

Typescript on "Kenya: Scenarios of Dramatic  
Political Change" (GI M 85-10074L)

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Copy 294 of 31

State Dept. review completed

25X1

SUBJECT: Kenya: Scenarios of Dramatic Political Change  
 (GI M 85-10074L)

25X1

# Distribution List

## External/non-NFIB:

Copy 1 The Honorable Phillip H. Ringdahl, Director of  
 African Affairs, National Security Council  
 2 The Honorable Chester A. Crocker, Assistant  
 Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Dept of State  
 3 The Honorable Gerald E. Thomas, US Ambassador,  
 Nairobi, Kenya  
 4 The Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Chairman, Policy  
 Planning Council, National Security Council  
 5 The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of  
 Defense for Policy, Dept of Treasury  
 6-9 DI Rep/OLL  
 10-12 Extra Copies (PI)

## External NFIB:

13 The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, Director, Bureau  
 of Intelligence and Research, Dept of State  
 14 Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Special Assistant to the  
 Secretary for National Security, Dept of Treasury  
 15 Vice Admiral E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., Director,  
 Intelligence Community Staff

## Internal:

16 DCI  
 17 DDCI  
 18 Executive Director  
 19 NIO/AF  
 20 SRP/ODCI  
 21 C/PES  
 22 DDI  
 23 D/OGI  
 24 OGI/IIC  
 25-26 OGI/IIC/PI  
 27 D/CPAS  
 28 SA/DA/CPAS  
 29-29A C/IMC/CPAS  
 30-31 OCR/DSD/DB  
 32 D/ALA  
 33 C/ALA/AF  
 34 C/ALA/AF/East Africa Branch  
 35 C/DO/AF  
 37 C/DO/AF

25X1

OGI/IIC/PI (14 Mar 85)

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

**KENYA: SCENARIOS OF DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE**

25X1

**PREFACE**

This memorandum explores alternative scenarios that could lead to the ouster of President Moi or other dramatic change in Kenya. Specifically, it seeks to clarify the individuals and groups that might attempt to seize power, circumstances which could impel or impede takeover attempts, and indicators that would suggest specific scenarios are unfolding. The analysis, purposely provocative, does not attempt to predict the likelihood of specific outcomes other than in the broadest sense. Rather, it provides a structured way of thinking about possible leadership change in Kenya on the basis of observable events and thus a greater ability to recognize the potential implications of key developments.

25X1

**SUMMARY**

Growing tribal tensions and a faltering economy are bringing increased pressure on President Daniel arap Moi's regime. The greatest potential threat to the regime comes from the middle and junior ranks of the military. They are staffed largely by members of the once dominant Kikuyu tribe, and Moi's efforts to favor the smaller tribes over the Kikuyu are making these officers increasingly restive. If Moi persists, he could precipitate a mid-level or junior officer coup or an assassination attempt. In the event Moi were to die or become incapacitated, Vice President Kibaki--a Kikuyu--probably would

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, with a contribution from [redacted] Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Information available as of 13 March 1985 was used in this report. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to [redacted] Chief/Political Instability Branch, OGI [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

GI M 85-10074L

25X1

25X1

Copy 27H of 32

[redacted]

replace him, but growing tribal tensions could disrupt the succession process. [redacted]

25X1

In our view, the prospects for a coup by senior military officers are dim. The senior ranks of the military are loyal to Moi, and they probably would move against the President only if they believed he was undermining the legitimacy of the regime by stifling all political dissent, ignoring blatant corruption, and grossly politicizing the military. [redacted]

25X1

Other politically sensitive issues such as education, unemployment, and land redistribution could intensify tribal antagonisms leading to popular upheaval. Trade unions, government workers, and students would be in the forefront of organizing anti-regime protests, but it is unlikely they could bring down the government unless they gained the military's support or the military was paralyzed by the same tribal divisions. [redacted]

25X1

If a popular upheaval toppled the regime, a successor government might turn to the USSR or Libya for assistance and restrict US access to the naval facility at Mombasa on the Indian Ocean. A move by either senior grade or middle- and junior-rank officers to oust Moi would mark a drastic departure from the military's traditionally apolitical role, but it is unlikely either outcome would significantly alter Kenya's Western orientation. [redacted]

25X1

## THE PRESENT SCENE

President Daniel arap Moi enjoys the support of a coalition of small tribes and senior military officers, but growing tribal tensions and the faltering economy are bringing increasing pressure on the regime. Moi, a Kalenjin, has slowly eroded the privileged position of the dominant Kikuyu tribe relative to the tribes in his coalition--Kalenjin, Kamba, Luhya, and Kisii.<sup>1</sup>

25X1

Since assuming the Presidency upon the natural death of Kenyatta in 1978, Moi has promoted the interests of the smaller tribes by:

- o removing many Kikuyu from the Cabinet;
- o expelling Kikuyu opponents from the sole political party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU);
- o promoting Kalenjin and Kamba to senior military posts;
- o restricting Kikuyu access to universities and government positions;
- o limiting Kikuyu access to credit and challenging Kikuyu land titles; and
- o replacing Kikuyu on the parastatal boards that regulate agricultural markets.

25X1

Moi's actions have raised ethnic tensions among the Kikuyu-dominated junior- and middle-grade officer ranks. Kikuyu officers, according to Embassy reporting, resent his maneuverings, view his "affirmative action" program as damaging

---

<sup>1</sup>The Kikuyu are the largest single tribal group in Kenya and make up 21 percent of the population; the Luo make up 13 percent; the Luhya, Kalenjin, Kamba approximately 11 percent each; and the Kisii 6 percent.

25X1

[redacted]

to their political and economic prospects, and believe his policies are becoming increasingly authoritarian and repressive. Such resentment has led to rumors of both coup plotting and assassination attempts. [redacted]

25X1

The economy poses additional problems for Moi. Economic growth has declined by almost half from the 7 percent rate enjoyed during the Kenyatta years (1963-78). Urban unemployment stands at 33 percent. In fact, this year only 5 percent of the workers entering the labor market will find jobs, leaving a large pool of unemployed who will seek relief from the government. Many of the unemployed are university graduates who in the past could expect the government to provide them jobs as a result of their education. [redacted]

25X1

Land is also a growing point of contention. Only about 18 percent of the land is arable. It already is overcrowded, and past tribal confrontations over land have been violent. The Kikuyu in particular have a bloody legacy of rural insurgency from the days of the Mau Mau Emergency when they fought against the colonial regime as well as against other Africans. Moreover, the scarcity of arable land, inefficient grain distribution monopolies, and recurrent drought have adversely affected food production. Agricultural productivity has declined to the point that Kenyans, who had been nearly self-sufficient in food production, now need to import wheat for the first time as well as significantly more corn. [redacted]

25X1

Although stockpiles have allowed Kenya to maintain export levels thus far, the failure of the long rains last spring will

[redacted]

reduce coffee and tea export revenues this year. Importing badly needed grain will further reduce exchange reserves. Despite ample rain during the fall, Kenya needs the long spring rains to bring coffee and tea production back to normal. Even if the rains come and crop production increases, export revenues will not begin to flow into the economy until well into 1985. [redacted]

25X1

#### GROUPS CAPABLE OF SEIZING POWER AND OTHER ACTORS

The Military, apolitical and pro-Western, remains the least tribalized of Kenya's institutions. Nevertheless, ethnic differences have sharpened and politicization has increased since an abortive coup by Air Force personnel in August 1982. Loyal Kalenjin and Kamba senior officers quickly put down the revolt that was led by a small group of Luo enlisted men and [redacted] [redacted] Kikuyu junior officers. To avert similar challenges Moi removed suspect elements from the armed forces. The Kikuyu commander of the General Service Unit--Kenya's elite paramilitary force--was replaced by a Meru tribesman, and the force's responsibilities were downgraded. In addition, Moi subordinated the Air Force to an Army command under General Haji Mohamed, a Somali. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted] The Kikuyu have a history of political violence--one notable example being the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969. Their ethnic pride, knowledge of military

25X1



organization, access to weapons, and natural tribal networking would make them a serious threat, especially if middle-grade officers lent their support. [REDACTED]

25X1

By all accounts the senior ranks of the military--infused with many Kalenjin officers appointed by Moi--are loyal, but this support could be shaken if tribal politics determine the choice of a replacement for Chief of the General Staff Mulinge who is nearing retirement. Moi removed General Joseph Musomba, an ambitious Kamba who was the front-runner, from contention by naming him to a previously unfilled post as Ambassador to Pakistan. Now the most likely successor to Mulinge is a Kalenjin, General John Sawe. Sawe is a competent officer, but tribal antagonisms could intensify if the appointment is seen as a calculated move by Moi to promote his tribe's interests.

25X1

In addition to the military, Moi relies on two security forces. The Directorate of Special Intelligence and Security (the Special Branch) handles internal security and counterintelligence tasks, has a reputation for efficiency and professionalism, and is loyal to the regime. The General Service Unit is an autonomous paramilitary unit within the National Police Force responsible for presidential protection and counterinsurgency. It has been dominated by Kikuyu, and Moi has sought to reduce its potential for troublemaking by recruiting more Kalenjin into its ranks. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) is an umbrella organization formed by Kenyatta to maintain control over

[redacted]

individual trade unions. It is carefully monitored by the government, and its leadership usually does not foster political activism. A potential exception is Justus Mulei, the Secretary General of the COTU. According to the US Embassy, he is in touch with the more militant rank and file elements of the labor movement. [redacted]

25X1

The rank and file frequently stage minor work stoppages without COTU backing, but their impact has been slight. The steady decline in real wages since 1980, however, could trigger full-fledged illegal strikes, particularly if a leader like Mulei or Kimani wa Nyoike--the former Secretary General of the Civil Servants Union--encouraged labor's discontent. Kimani, a politically ambitious Kikuyu, probably could rally the support of his tribal brothers who are numerous in the unions. [redacted]

25X1

Although historically apolitical, the Church is another potential source of anti-regime political activism. Specifically, the National Christian Council of Kenya could provide a base for organizing interdenominational political activity. Two-thirds of the population is Christian and most attend Saturday harambee groups as well as Sunday services. The churches also have developed a broad popular base by providing educational and medical services. [redacted]

25X1

Moi is sensitive to the potential power of the Church and its ability to challenge his rule. For example, when one clergyman recently offered prayers for political dissident

[redacted]

Charles Njonjo after he was expelled from the ruling party, the government responded by banning all live religious broadcasts.<sup>1</sup>

[redacted]

25X1

### Minor Actors

The Kenya African National Union (KANU) has been Kenya's premier political party since the mid-1960's. It was declared the sole legal party in 1982, and membership is required for all government employees since the beginning of this year. By making the KANU the only party, Moi has closed a safety valve for the opposition. In turn, he has stifled dissent within the KANU by expelling outspoken members from the party. [redacted]

25X1

The Asians constitute 1 percent of the population and account for almost half of the retail trade community. Their perceived wealth and superior education is a source of friction with many black Kenyans. If the political climate becomes less hospitable--for example, posts held by Asians are Africanized or onerous trade restrictions are imposed--the US Embassy believes Asians probably would rather flee than fight. Their departure would remove a valuable source of entrepreneurial skill and seriously disrupt the urban economy. [redacted]

25X1

Foreign governments have had little success developing links to potential anti-regime elements. [redacted]

25X1

---

<sup>1</sup>Moi, seeing Njonjo's growing, albeit controversial, role among Kikuyu as a potential threat, expelled him from the party on the pretext of treason in 1983. Although Njonjo is not personally popular, his case became a symbol of the Kikuyu cause. Njonjo was never convicted of a crime, but in December 1984 Moi "pardoned" him without reinstating his party membership. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted] Three Libyans recently joined the People's Bureau, perhaps indicating their intention to increase activity in Kenya. Soviet efforts to infiltrate trade unions and gain influence by establishing trade agreements and lines of credit also largely have failed. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

A few small dissident groups like the December 12 Movement and Chama Cha Wananchi espouse anti-government rhetoric or advocate the overthrow of the government, but their impact is extremely circumscribed. The Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners in Kenya is an exile group of University of Nairobi intellectuals based in the UK. Although unlikely to generate any mass appeal, it has ties to Kikuyu students at the University. [redacted]

25X1

Students are generally apolitical and do not have a network capable of toppling the regime, but demonstrations at the University can be a serious irritant to the government. For example, protests instigated by a few student agitators in February led to violent clashes with police resulting in some deaths and the suspension of classes. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**SCENARIOS OF DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE**

The four scenarios presented below are not intended to imply that an orderly succession will not take place or that instability is inevitable. We are simply presenting a series of events and processes that under certain conditions could dramatically change the nature of the regime. Following each scenario is a list of indicators--a series of observable events--which signal milestones in the scenario's progression. Like a major road from which a number of forks can be taken, several of the scenarios share some of the same signposts. Each scenario, though, is likely to manifest some of these common indicators in different combinations and other indicators that are unique. Hence the observation of some indicators may merely suggest a general direction while others may represent major turning points.

25X1

**Constitutional Succession Crisis**

Moi at age 60 is in good health. If he were to die or become incapacitated, however, the constitution provides for Vice President Kibaki to succeed him and call elections within 90 days. Kibaki, a Kikuyu, probably has enough support to ensure his nomination and election. His position as Vice President of the KANU would give him an additional advantage, but tribal factors could complicate the succession. In the unlikely event Kibaki began aggressively to promote Kikuyu interests immediately upon coming to power, non-Kikuyu might try to block his candidacy and back someone else like Simeon Nyachae, Moi's powerful Chief Secretary. On the other hand, if Kibaki were weak or

[redacted]

vacillating, he might face challenges from Kikuyu such as Kenneth Matiba, Minister for Culture and Social Services. [redacted]

25X1

If, under such circumstances, the military and civilian elite agreed on an alternative candidate, they probably could ensure his nomination and election. If not, a fight over the nomination would exacerbate tribal tensions, perhaps leading to a political stalemate. Any victor who emerged from such a struggle would be in a weak position: a minority tribe member would face Kikuyu obstructionism, and a Kikuyu President would have to deal with pressure from a coalition of smaller tribes that supported his candidacy. As a result, student and labor groups could take advantage of the power vacuum to increase agitation. [redacted]

25X1

#### **Indicators of the Developing Scenario**

- o Moi is incapacitated, dies of natural causes, or is assassinated.
- o Rumors spread that if elected Kibaki intends to replace non-Kikuyu in the Cabinet with Kikuyu.
- o The press becomes more critical of the regime.
- o Non-Kikuyu in the government and military withdraw support from Kibaki and call for his resignation.
- o Kibaki announces his intention to fight for the nomination, claiming he is the legitimate heir to Moi.
- o KANU party discipline breaks down and other candidates challenge Kibaki.
- o Civilian and military leaders begin to publicly support an alternative candidate. [redacted]

25X1

#### **Junior- and Middle-Grade Officers Launch a Coup**

Kikuyu dissatisfaction with Moi's political and social policies could provoke junior- or middle-ranking officers to initiate an assassination or coup attempt. [redacted]

25X1

Junior- or middle-grade officers probably would rather turn over power to a civilian than run the government themselves. Likely candidates would be Vice President Kibaki or Culture Minister Matiba. Since senior officers command rank and file respect and military discipline is good, a coup attempt almost certainly would have to enjoy at least the tacit support of the senior officers, many of whom are members of smaller tribes. Such support most likely would be less forthcoming should a Kikuyu other than Kibaki be proposed as the replacement for Moi.

25X1

#### **Indicators of the Developing Scenario**

- o Moi appoints more non-Kikuyu to senior military and government positions.
- o New appointees prove inept and corruption increases.
- o Moi tightens control over the KANU and continues Kikuyu expulsions.

- o Moi further reduces educational opportunities for the Kikuyu.
- o Moi makes a decision that appears to Kikuyu as the "last straw;" for example, he announces plans to establish the office of Prime Minister, thus challenging Kibaki's position.
- o Reports surface that middle-grade and junior officers are joining in a coup plot.
- o Kikuyu in the General Service Unit, angered by the infusions of many non-Kikuyu in their ranks, join in coup plotting.
- o Tribal splits develop in the senior military ranks-- for example, over the issue of Mulinge's successor--

25X1  
25X1

### **A Coup by Senior Officers**

The Kenyan military, particularly the senior ranks, traditionally have been apolitical, professional, and respectful of the constitutional system. For these reasons, we believe both Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu senior officers would initiate a coup only if it appeared that Moi was undermining the legitimacy of the regime by stifling all political dissent and grossly politicizing the military.

25X1

The President has taken some steps over the past few years to harness political dissent. He dismantled the fledgling two party system--making the KANU the sole legal party--and has made party membership mandatory for all government employees. If Moi continues to expel critics from the party and allows the KANU to function only as a government mouthpiece, he will become increasingly vulnerable to charges that he is subverting Kenya's democratic traditions.

25X1



[redacted]

Incompetence, corruption, and nepotism also could become major issues of contention between Moi and his senior military staff. Moi's decision to emphasize the appointment of non-Kikuyu to government posts has engendered resentment from Kikuyu. If these appointees prove conspicuously inept or grossly corrupt, we believe the senior staff would become increasingly wary of Moi's judgment. In particular, Moi's apparent maneuvering to replace the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces with a Kalenjin could add fuel to charges of nepotism and directly affect military interests. [redacted]

25X1

The US Embassy believes that senior officers would first seek to bring pressure on Moi to moderate his course, leaving him some room to maneuver. In the event, however, that Moi refused to listen to their advice and tried to politicize their role, we believe they would attempt to remove him. [redacted]

25X1

The catalyst for a coup could come if senior military officers believed Moi was using the military to suppress legitimate political dissent. For example, Moi suspects that some students supported the 1982 coup attempt. If additional outbreaks like a recent violent confrontation between University of Nairobi students and the police occurred, Moi might order a major and indiscriminate crackdown on the student population. Similarly, a food distribution crisis precipitated largely by government incompetence could spark widespread demonstrations. In the event the police were unable to control either situation, Moi would seek the support of the military. Senior officers would resist if they believed the President was overreacting by

insisting that they take overly harsh action against the protesters. [REDACTED]

25X1

If Moi were removed, Vice President Kibaki would be the logical and constitutional successor. To our knowledge, Kibaki has not alienated any major segment of the government or military, and he probably would gain the support of Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu alike in an effort to restore effective leadership. Kenya enjoys well-developed political institutions and a proven succession process which would add to Kibaki's legitimacy. His assumption of the Presidency under these circumstances would portend stability at least in the short term. [REDACTED]

25X1

#### **Indicators of the Developing Scenario**

- o Moi demonstrates he is unable to manage the economy, for example, by allowing foreign reserves to fall dangerously low.
- o Moi's non-Kikuyu appointees prove inept, thereby diminishing confidence in the regime.
- o The civil service, long celebrated for its non-partisan status, engages increasingly in nepotism because of the law requiring party membership.
- o Dissident religious leaders attack the regime and organize church groups in opposition to Moi.
- o Moi's speeches focus on suppressing dissent, and he criticizes outspoken religious leaders.
- o Moi's policies become increasingly authoritarian, and he imposes formal press censorship.
- o A major political scandal surfaces, and Moi is unable to moderate the damage.
- o Moi becomes increasingly insulated from the political situation; he ignores senior officers who caution moderation.
- o Violent clashes erupt between civilians and police; the military is called upon to restore order.

- o Reports surface that senior military officers are involved with Vice President Kibaki in forging a broadly-based coup plot. [REDACTED]

25X1

### **Ethnically-Based Social Upheaval**

The Kikuyu traditionally have been divided by regional loyalties, but extreme circumstances might motivate them to unite in opposition to the regime. If these pressures were sufficient, Kikuyu could cause serious disruptions in urban and rural areas. Greater Kikuyu dissatisfaction with the regime would be sparked by the perception that broadly-based, government-initiated reforms were being implemented unevenly. Specifically, government policies that adversely affected Kikuyu interests in the business community, the civil service, and labor organizations could be interpreted as attacks on their tribal identity. [REDACTED]

25X1

Moreover, politically sensitive issues like education, unemployment, and land redistribution could fuel opposition to the regime and intensify tribal antagonisms to the point of popular upheaval. Opposition sentiment could crystallize, for example, if Moi:

- o Continues his policy of adjusting tribal quotas for university admissions to the detriment of the Kikuyu;
- o Appears to be unduly favoring non-Kikuyu university graduates in filling any available government posts;
- o Pushes the implementation of procedures to repossess Kikuyu-owned land in the Rift Valley;
- o Further increases prices to boost agricultural output, causing higher food costs that alienate urban consumers, many of whom are Kikuyu civil servants, laborers, and students. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

Moi may be able to suppress dissidence at first by becoming more repressive and relying on the military to keep order. Festered ethnic divisions in the military between ranks and among the ruling coalition, however, could intensify if Moi were perceived as unduly favoring (or harassing) one group. If the military split along tribal lines, its ability to put down disturbances would diminish. Prolonged social upheaval could follow, resulting in a narrowly-based tribal government lacking popular support. [REDACTED]

25X1

### Indicators of the Developing Scenario

- o Economic decline becomes precipitous: the long rains fail, imports increase and exports decrease, inflation skyrockets, famine develops, foreign exchange declines sharply, and corruption remains visible.
- o Moi mismanages reform measures, agricultural production falters, real wages continue to fall, and consumer prices rise.
- o Moi further limits Kikuyu access to credit.
- o Sporadic food shortages become chronic; food riots erupt in the urban areas.
- o Tribally-based rural violence erupts over land disputes.
- o Wildcat strikes increase; a popular labor leader emerges and begins to organize unions on an industrial basis.
- o Many positions held by Asians are Africanized, and a large segment of the Asian community leaves the country.
- o Groups like the December 12 Movement attract a wider audience and inject anti-US rhetoric into labor protests.
- o Exiled dissidents return and forge alliances with student movements.
- o Libyans have some success infiltrating trade unions and fomenting anti-regime dissent.

- o The government increasingly calls on the security forces to keep order, but the National Police and the General Service Unit split along tribal lines and some factions mutiny.
- o The government turns to the military to keep order, but it splits along tribal lines and is ineffective.

25X1

### IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Political upheaval in Kenya could lead to the loss of a valuable US ally in the region and possibly access to the naval facility at Mombasa on the Indian Ocean. Kenya is strategically situated near the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Along with Somalia, Sudan, and North Yemen, Kenya provides a counterweight to Soviet influence in Ethiopia and in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Moreover, upheaval in Kenya would severely damage the communication, transportation, and financial networks in East Africa.

25X1

Nonetheless, the succession of Vice President Kibaki or another civilian through constitutional or quasi-constitutional procedures or the assumption of power by senior military officers (our first and third scenarios) would not change Kenya's basic Western orientation. US access to port facilities at Mombasa, landing rights at airfields, and military cooperation in training exercises probably would continue. Senior officers might be more inclined to enhance US-Kenyan military cooperation, but any successor regime most likely would want to maintain at least the veneer of a nonaligned foreign policy. (S NF)

The US Embassy believes that a junior officer regime (our second scenario) would not sever ties with the United States

[redacted]

because it would need Western assistance. Moreover, a considerable number of junior officers receive training in the United States, giving them positive exposure to the US military and government. [redacted]

25X1

An unchecked deterioration in the economic and social fabric of the country (our last scenario) would be the most damaging for US interests in the region. Moi probably would seek massive amounts of US military and economic aid, but he would have to balance his needs against domestic political pressure to remain nonaligned. Presently, he plays down US-Kenyan military agreements, preferring to keep them out of the public eye. If the United States begins to play a more visible role in Kenya and Moi increasingly resorts to repression, there could be a strong anti-US backlash. If, on the other hand, the United States were not forthcoming with assistance, Moi might threaten to seek aid from non-Western sources in order to gain leverage over the United States and mitigate anti-US sentiment at home. Given the President's pro-Western disposition, this is unlikely, but it would open the door to increased Soviet and Libyan meddling.

[redacted]

25X1